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Unlike the existing literature on sports betting, which concentrates on ar-
bitrage within a single market, this paper examines inter-market arbitrage 
by searching for arbitrage opportunities through combining bets at the 
bookmaker and the exchange market. Using the posted odds of eight dif-
ferent bookmakers and the corresponding odds traded at a well-known bet 
exchange for 5,478 football matches played in the top-five European 
leagues during three seasons, we find (only) ten intra-market arbitrage op-
portunities. However, we find 1,450 cases in which a combined bet at the 
bookmaker as well as at the exchange yields a guaranteed positive return. 
Further analyses reveal that inter-market arbitrage emerges from different 
levels of informational efficiency between the two markets. 
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Introduction 
Arbitrage is typically defined as “the simultaneous purchase and sale of the 
same, or essentially similar, security in two different markets for advanta-
geously different prices”  (Sharpe & Alexander, 1990; cited in Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997, p.35). The efficient market hypothesis relies to a large extent 
on the assumption that any arbitrage opportunity is exploited quickly once it 
appears. Smith, Paton and Vaughan Williams (2005) regard it as “the purest 
form of weak form inefficiency”, when price differences permit riskless arbi-
trage.  
Thus far, all empirical papers that have addressed arbitrage in sports betting 
have concentrated on arbitrage in a single market setting. The traditional 
forms of sports betting are either a pari-mutuel totalizator system or a book-
maker system. In pari-mutual betting, risk-free arbitrage is not possible; the 
payout ratio is not ex ante determined because it depends on the final betting 
volumes placed at each possible outcome.
 Arbitrage opportunities can only be 
identified ex post. Hausch and Ziemba (1990) and Edelman and O’Brian 
(2004) showed that positive returns can be achieved in pari-mutual betting if 
bets are spread across different betting pools. In testing cross-track betting in 
major horse races, Hausch and Ziemba (1990) found that ten combined bets 
generated an average positive return of 9.2%. However, as mentioned previ-
ously, formulating a risk-free arbitrage strategy in pari-mutual betting is im-
possible because the payout ratios are not known ex ante. In the bookmaker 
system, risk-free arbitrage is possible because the odds are fixed and publicly 
announced before the event takes place.
1 Empirical studies that tested arbi-
trage in bookmaker betting discovered arbitrage opportunities when the num-
ber of bookmakers analysed was sufficiently large. Pope and Peel (1989) dis-
covered one occasion with a guaranteed arbitrage return of 2% in a data sam-
ple containing the odds of four different bookmakers in English soccer betting 
during the 1981/82 season. Dixon and Pope (2004) did not find a single arbi-
trage opportunity in the U.K. fixed-odds soccer betting market from 1993 to 
                                     
1   In practice, however, there are some remaining sources of risk that have to be considered 
as we will discuss later in this article.  
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1996, using data from only three bookmakers. They argued that the disap-
pearance of arbitrage opportunities could indicate improved and more efficient 
forecasting by bookmakers. Vlastakis, Dotsis and Markellos (2009), however, 
disagreed with this conjecture. They found 63 cases of arbitrage in a sample 
covering 12,841 soccer matches across 26 different countries during the 
2002/03 and 2003/04 seasons.  
In recent years, a novel betting market has emerged: exchange betting. Online 
person-to-person betting differs from the traditional betting markets in that 
bettors can not only buy bets (bet on a given outcome), but they can also sell 
bets (bet against a given outcome). In exchange betting, individuals can trade 
their bets at an online platform such as betfair.com. The odds are determined 
by a continuous double auction process that matches supply and demand. 
With the recent advent of betting exchanges, the magnitude of arbitrage op-
portunities is expected to have increased substantially. First, price differences 
are likely to be larger across, as opposed to within, markets. Empirical studies 
(Levitt, 2004; Smith, Paton, & Vaughan Williams, 2009; Franck, Verbeek, & 
Nüesch, 2009) have shown that bookmakers and bettors do not perform 
equally well in predicting the outcome of sporting events. This may cause sys-
tematic price differences between the bookmaker and the bet exchange mar-
ket. Second, bet exchange companies charge significantly lower commissions 
than the bookmakers because they, unlike bookmakers, do not bear any risk. 
And third, to hedge against the uncertainty of the match outcome placing a 
bet on all possible outcomes of an event is not necessary; a bettor can simply 
buy favourable odds from a bookmaker and sell it directly, at a higher price, 
on the bet exchange platform.  
This paper is the first to search for guaranteed arbitrage returns by combin-
ing bets on the bookmaker market and the exchange market. We therefore 
collected the posted odds of eight different bookmakers and matched them 
with the corresponding odds traded at the Betfair platform. Betfair is a well-
known betting exchange that claims to organise 90% of all exchange-based 
betting activity worldwide (Croxson & Reade, 2008). The data set covers all 
soccer matches played in the major leagues of the “Big Five” (England, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain) during three seasons (2004/05 to 
2006/07), for a total sample size of 5,478 matches. Our analysis reveals ten 
intra-market arbitrage opportunities in which price differences among book- 
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makers exceed commissions. Inter-market arbitrage is, however, far more 
likely. We find 1,450 inter-market arbitrage opportunities that yielded an av-
erage return of 1.2%. Thus, for more than one in four matches, an optimal 
combination of odds from a bookmaker and odds traded at the bet exchange 
yielded a positive return independent of the game’s outcome.  
The observation that there are numerous inter-market arbitrage opportunities 
in sports betting begs the question of which of the two markets can be held 
responsible. Inter-market arbitrage opportunities can arise from pure noise or 
from unequal levels of informational efficiency between the two markets. Ac-
cordingly, in the second part of this paper, we study the comparable efficiency 
of the different market settings. 
We simulate a betting strategy that buys a single bet at the bookmaker 
market and at the bet exchange market whenever we identified an inter-
market arbitrage opportunity. With this simple betting strategy, increasing 
the mean return from an average of -7.2% to 12.6% is possible at the 
bookmaker market, whereas the average return at the bet exchange decreases 
from -1.8% to -4.6%. Thus, individual bettors can achieve higher but risky 
returns if they use arbitrage opportunities only to detect favourable 
bookmaker odds without (costly) hedging at the bet exchange. These 
summary statistics indicate that the odds offered at the bookmaker market 
are less efficient than the prices traded on the bet exchange market. Further 
multivariate tests confirm this finding. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the 
theoretical background for arbitrage opportunities within and between the 
two market mechanisms is introduced. Next, we present the empirical findings 
on both intra- and inter-market arbitrage opportunities. Subsequently, we test 
the extent to which each market contributes to creating the inter-market ar-
bitrage opportunities. The final section offers some concluding remarks. 
Theoretical background 
A betting market is a simple speculative market, where contracts on some 
future cash flow are traded. The direction of the cash flow is tied to the out-
come of a given event; in our context, it is the outcome of a soccer game. In  
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fixed-odds betting, the size of the cash flow is determined by the odds.
2 Al-
though in special occasions the odds may change over time, the size of the 
bettor’s claim is tied to the initially taken odd and does not depend on subse-
quent price changes. There are two distinct market mechanisms for fixed-odds 
betting: The bookmaker and the bet exchange market.  
The bookmaker market is (still) the most popular form of sports gambling. 
Here, the odds are unilaterally determined by the bookmaker and published a 
few days before the game starts.
3 Bettors can place their bets at these odds 
while the bookmaker takes the opposite position. In European sports betting, 
the odds are typically represented as “decimal odds”; they determine the pay-
out ratio on a winning bet. Thus, for each possible outcome   of a sporting 
event, the bookmaker   posts his odds   , .  At these odds, the bettor can place 
a wager that the outcome of the match will actually be  . The bettor’s ex-
pected return of this bet is 
      ,         ,   1    1       1        ,   1, (1)
where    is the true probability of the outcome   to occur.    ,   1    corre-
sponds to the bettor’s net return if the outcome of the match is   (a winning 
bet), which is multiplied by the probability of this event to happen. As we set 
the stake of the bet to unity,   1  is the bettor’s net return in case the 
match’s result is not   (a losing bet) times the probability of this particular 
event. The inverse of the posted decimal odds 
 
  , 
 can be interpreted as the 
bookmaker’s probability of the underlying match outcome to occur. For a 
given match, the probabilities of all possible events sum up to greater than 
one because the bookmaker’s margin or “overround” is already included in the 
                                     
2   An exception is pari-mutual betting, where the bettor’s claim is tied to the volumes placed 
on each side of the event at the moment the market is closed. Here, the betting volumes 
on all possible outcomes are aggregated and then distributed to the winners according to 
their relative stakes. Therefore, the bettor’s claim is not ex ante fixed but depends on bet-
ting volumes. Pari-mutual betting is still common in horse racing but is becoming less im-
portant compared to fixed-odds betting. 
3   The bookmakers actually have the right to adjust odds after the market has opened, but 




  , 
   1  . The average bookmaker’s margin in our sample ranges 
between 10.9% (B365 and Gamebookers) and 14.1% (Interwetten).  
The person-to-person bet exchange is a different market mechanism. Here, it 
is not the bookmaker but another bettor taking the opposite side of a con-
tract. Thus, individuals can directly trade the bets with each other at a plat-
form where the bettors post the prices under which they are willing to place a 
bet - on or against - a given outcome. The latent demand for wagers is col-
lected and presented in the order book that publicly displays the most attrac-
tive odds with the corresponding available volumes. The bettor has the choice 
to either submit a limit order and wait for another participant to match her 
bet or to submit a market order and directly match an already offered bet. As 
a result, there is a continuous double auction process taking place at the plat-
form. If two bettors with opposing opinions agree on a price, their demands 
are automatically translated into a transaction. Thus, the odds traded at a 
bet exchange are not determined by a specific market maker, e.g., the book-
maker, but are the result of a continuous matching of supply and demand. 
The provider of the platform typically charges a commission fee c on the bet-
tors’ net profits. The commission fee of Betfair, for example, ranges between 
2% to 5% percent depending on the individual’s annual betting activity.  
After a bet on the outcome   of a given event has been matched, both indi-
viduals hold a contract on a future cash flow. The size of the cash flow is de-
termined by the agreed odd    , , and the direction of the cash flow depends 
on the actual outcome of the underlying event combined with the position a 
given bettor holds. He can either hold the “long position” or the “short posi-
tion”. If a bettor goes long, he bets that the outcome   will occur. The ex-
pected return in that case is similar to wagering at the bookmaker market 
with the exception that the commission fee   on his net winnings has to be 
included, where 0   1 . Therefore, the bettor’s expected return on a long 
position bet with an agreed price    ,  is  
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       , 
             ,   1    1       1       1 
        ,  1        1   .   (2)
As already mentioned, Equation (2) is similar to Equation (1) besides the fact 
that the commission fee   is charged on the winning bet, whereas the book-
maker’s margin is already included in the offered odds.     
Alternatively, if a bettor goes short, he bets that the outcome   will not oc-
cur. The expected return on a short position bet with    ,  is 
       , 
              1     1     
1
   ,   1
 1   
 
1  
   ,   1
      
1  
   ,   1
 1   . 
(3)
As Equation (3) illustrates the opposite market position to Equation (2), the 
expected return when going short also depends on the actual outcome prob-
ability    and the traded odd    ,  inversely entering the equation. Thus, the 
return on a short position bet, holding    constant, decreases with    , . 
 
Next, we examine the composition of arbitrage opportunities in the betting 
market. An arbitrage bet requires buying a contract at one price and contem-
poraneously selling the same or equivalent contract at a higher price. The 
stakes placed on each side have to be chosen such that the return of the com-
bined bet does not depend on the actual outcome of the game. We denote a 
combined bet fulfilling this condition a hedged bet. An arbitrage opportunity 
arises if the price difference exceeds the transaction costs involved. In order to 
overcome these transaction costs, the arbitrageur must seek for favourable 
selling conditions offered by other bookmakers (intra-market arbitrage) or by 
the betting exchange market (inter-market arbitrage).  
First, we consider intra-market arbitrage. Since, at the bookmaker market, a 
bet can exclusively be placed on a given outcome to occur, to “sell” a bet re- 
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quires going long in each complementary outcome of the event. Thus, the ar-
bitrageur has to wager a proportion    of his overall stake on each outcome of 
the match. To overcome the transaction costs, he has to select the most fa-
vourable odds      m a x     ,   from a set of bookmakers    1,2,..,I . His ex-
pected return of the combined bet is then 
    Π              
 
        
 
.  (3)
To hedge this bet, the stakes    have to be spread over the outcomes in such 
a way that the probability    in the return equation can be dropped. There-
fore, the bettor has to choose his stakes inversely proportional to the odds. 
This implies that the payoff is constant over all possible outcomes of an 
event, thus              .      . Since we are interested in the return of this bet-
ting strategy, we set the overall stake to unity, thus ∑       1 . These two con-
ditions are jointly fulfilled if the proportion of a one unit wager placed on 
each outcome of the match is 
    
   
1




   
  
 .  (5)
The equation for the return of the intra-market hedged bet then reduces to 
  Π       
1
∑ 1
   
   
 1   .  
(6)
If the differences of the odds of the involved bookmakers are larger than the 
associated margins, the intra-market hedged bet yields a positive return. 
Hence, an intra-market arbitrage opportunity arises if 
   
1
      
 1   (7)
holds.  
Next, we examine inter-market arbitrage. Here, we include the possibility of 
placing wagers at the exchange market to hedge a bet. There are two different  
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ways to hedge a bet in the inter-market arbitrage case.  The arbitrageur can 
take the long position on a given outcome at the exchange market or book-
maker market and can bet on all contrary outcomes, effectively reselling his 
contract. We will refer to this method as the long position inter-market arbi-
trage strategy. An alternative is to go short at the exchange market in order 
to “sell” the contract bought at the bookmaker market. We define this method 
as the short position inter-market arbitrage strategy. 
The first strategy is very similar to the intra-market arbitrage case. The arbi-
trageur bets on all possible outcomes at the most advantageous odds. The 
only exception is that he seeks favourable odds not only from the bookmaker 
market but also from the exchange market. Hence, he places his bets on 
     m a x       ,      ,  1          . The stakes have to be balanced according to 
       , 
   
1
   
1
∑ 1
   
 
,  (8)
and the return on the long position inter-market hedged bet is 
  Π    
       
1
∑ 1
   
 
  1.   (9)
Thus, a long position inter-market arbitrage opportunity arises if 
   
1
     
 1   (10)
holds.  
A more elegant way to realise potential inter-market arbitrage returns is to 
directly sell a bet at the exchange market. Exchange markets offer the possi-
bility to place a bet not only on a certain outcome (a long position bet) but 
also against the outcome (a short position bet). Thus, the short position inter-
market arbitrage strategy buys a contract at the bookmaker and sells the 
same contract at a more favourable price at the bet exchange. The expected 
return of this arbitrage strategy is  
  9 
    Π     
              ,   
1  
   ,   1
      
1  
   ,   1
 1                 1   .  (11)
The stakes   ￿   ,  and    have to be balanced according to the following two 
conditions (i) 
        ,   
1  
   ,   1
 1                      .  ,   (12)
and (ii) 
      1        ,   (13)
in order to hedge the bet. Therefore, the proportion of a one-unit wager 
placed at the exchange market is 
        , 
   
   
      1  
   ,   1 1
.  (14)
At the bookmaker market, it is simply 
    
   1        , 
  .  (15)
The expression for the return of the short position inter-market hedged bet 
then reduces to 
  Π     
       m a x
 
 
       ,     
       ,   1         , 
 1  .   (4)
Even though the short position inter-market arbitrage strategy actually allows 
hedged bets on the event level (in our context a home win, a draw, or an 
away win), it does not make sense to place more than one hedged bet on the 
same match. Instead, we assume that the bettor only goes for the most at-
tractive short position hedged bet of a particular match. In doing so, the re-
turn of a short position inter-market hedged bet is positive if  
  10
       
    ,     
1  
  (5)
holds for at least one outcome of the match. Hence, a short position inter-
market arbitrage opportunity arises if the most attractive odd from the 
bookmaker market exceeds the corresponding odd from the exchange market 
after adjustment for the charged commission. Condition (17) is intuitive since 
the arbitrageur requires high odds from the bookmaker because he bets on the 
outcome at this market. On the exchange market, he needs low odds because 
he places a short bet that yields a higher payout ratio the lower the odds. 
Arbitrage opportunities in European soccer betting 
We examine the betting market on European soccer matches. Our data covers 
all matches played during three seasons (2004/05 to 2006/07) of the “Big-
Five” leagues (English Premier League, the French Ligue 1, the German 
Bundesliga, the Italian Serie A and the Spanish Primera Division), resulting 
in a total sample size of 5,478 games. The “Big-Five” leagues have a market 
share of over 50% in the European soccer market and are estimated to gener-
ate revenues of USD 20.4 billion. Average match attendance varied between 
21,800 (in the French League 1) and 39,500 (in the German Bundesliga) dur-
ing the 2006/07 season (Jones, 2009). 
We collected the odds of eight well-known bookmakers available at football-
data.co.uk, where odds are recorded on Friday afternoons for weekend games 
and on Tuesday afternoons for midweek games. The bookmakers include 
B365, Bwin, Gamebookers, Interwetten, Ladbrokes, William Hill, Stan James 
and VC Bet. Furthermore, we matched bookmaker data with corresponding 
betting exchange prices traded at betfair.com. As the odds of Betfair may 
(slightly) change over time, we made sure to collect odds at the same time as 
when bookmakers announce odds. Betfair is considered the most prominent 
bet exchange platform. With a weekly turnover of more than USD 50 million 
and over two million registered users, Betfair accounts for 90% of all ex-
change-based betting activity worldwide (Croxson & Reade, 2008). It has 
been online since 2000 and claims to process five million trades a day. In 
2008, Betfair generated revenues of USD 450 million (betfair-corporate.co.uk).  
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In the following, we calculate the returns of the hedged bets as outlined in the 
previous chapter. Table 1 presents our findings.  
 
The first column in Table 1 depicts the average returns of the three different 
hedged bets for all matches, whereas the second column illustrates the cases 
with an arbitrage opportunity, defined as hedged bets with a positive return. 
The upper block illustrates the average returns and the frequency of the intra-
market arbitrage bets, where only the odds of the eight different bookmakers 
are considered to form a hedged bet. The average return of all hedged book-

















Notes: The table gives an overview on arbitrage bets in the European soccer betting
market. It can be seen that the intra‐market strategy (upper block) is less attractive
than inter‐market arbitrage in terms of number of arbitrage opportunities. The short








margin of approximately -12%, but it is still negative. Out of 5,478 matches, 
we find ten arbitrage opportunities with an average return of 1.9%. This is 
approximately one arbitrage opportunity out of 500 matches, or 0.2%. The 
frequency of intra-market arbitrage opportunities in our sample is lower than 
the percentage of arbitrage opportunities of 0.5% found by Vlastakis et al. 
(2009). We must note, however, that Vlastakis et al. (2009) included not only 
soccer games of the “Big-Five” leagues, but also a variety of other European 
leagues and international tournaments in their sample.  
The middle and lower blocks in Table 1 illustrate the returns of hedged bets 
when considering both bookmakers’ odds and odds traded on Betfair. With 
the long position inter-market strategy, the average return was -1.8%, and 
12.5% of all matches offered an arbitrage opportunity. When adopting the 
short position inter-market strategy, the average return increases to -0.6%, 
with an arbitrage opportunity identified in 26.1% of all matches. Betting only 
on arbitrage opportunities yields an average return between 1.2% (short 
position inter-market) and 1.9% (intra-market).  The arbitrage returns are 
considerably lower than the average arbitrage return found by Vlastakis et al. 
(2009) of 21.8%. However, the fact that we find an inter-market arbitrage 
opportunity for more than one in four matches is remarkable. 
Figure 1 depicts the density functions of the returns of the hedged bets when 
following the three different arbitrage strategies to give a more comprehensive 






The  inter-market arbitrage strategy is far more attractive than the intra-
market arbitrage strategy. The distributions of returns following one of the 
inter-market arbitrage strategies are shifted to the right in comparison to the 
distribution of returns when combining only bookmaker bets. Furthermore, 
Figure 1 confirms the finding in Table 1 that the short position inter-market 
strategy offers the highest potential for arbitrage. Not only are the returns 
less negative at the low end of the distribution, but also the area under the 
curve at the positive side is the largest of all three arbitrage strategies.  
As postulated at the beginning of this paper, price heterogeneity is higher 
across the different market mechanisms than within the same market. The 
emergence of bet exchange platforms such as Betfair largely increased the 
number of opportunities in which positive returns are available without bear-
ing any risk related to the actual outcome of the game. Inter-market arbitrage 
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The short position inter-market strategy is thereby even more profitable than 
the long position inter-market strategy. Here, the bettor does not have to 
hedge by going long on the two alternative outcomes, but he can hedge his 
bet by directly selling it. In doing so, the margins (the bookmaker’s overround 
and the commission of Betfair) are charged only twice and not on three bets, 
as in the long position strategy. 
Of course, most matches for which the short position strategy identified an 
arbitrage opportunity also generate positive returns when following the long 
position strategy, and vice versa. However, as Table 2 shows, arbitrage oppor-
tunities existed exclusively when adopting the short position strategy in 763 
cases. In 19 cases, only the long position strategy yielded positive returns. 
 
Table 2 shows that the short position inter-market arbitrage strategy is by far 
the most profitable method; it provides an arbitrage opportunity in 1,431 
matches, from which it generates the highest return in 1,285 cases. 
Furthermore, Table 2 illustrates that every arbitrage strategy, for at least 






exclusively 2 19 763
with intra‐market ‐ 00
with long position inter‐market 0 ‐ 660
with short position inter‐market 0 660 ‐
all methods conjointly 8 8 8
total 10 687 1,431
highest arbitrage return 3 164 1,285
Arbitrage opportunities broken down by method
Notes: The table shows the number of matches providing arbitrage opportunities broken down
by arbitrage method. The first row describes the cases in which only one strategy leads to an
arbitrage opportunity. The following rows exihibit the cases where arbitrage opportunities
existed by employing different methods. It can be seen that out of 1,452 (1,431+2+19) matches




known ex ante, it is possible for the arbitrageur to choose for each match the 
arbitrage strategy with the highest return. When combining all three arbi-
trage strategies in an optimal way, we find 1,452 arbitrage opportunities. In 
other words, a guaranteed positive return is possible in 26.5% of all matches.  
 
Arbitrage bets as discussed are riskless in the sense that their return is inde-
pendent from the outcome of the match. However, there are some remaining 
sources of risk. First, there is the possibility of a bookmaker running into in-
solvency and being unable to pay out all winning bets.
4 More relevant than 
the default risk is the case of cancelled bets. Bookmakers and providers of bet 
exchange platforms can cancel bets after they have been placed due to, for 
example, technical problems or suspicion of fraud, and the bettors are re-
turned their initial stakes. If this happens only on one side of the arbitrage 
bet, then the hedge position is lost, and the return is therefore no longer in-
dependent from the actual outcome of the game.  
When establishing an arbitrage betting strategy, additional constraints men-
tioned in the general terms and conditions of bookmakers and bet exchange 
platforms have to be carefully considered. For example, the arbitrageur can-
not place infinitely high wagers as most bookmakers have limits for single bets 
(typically around USD 10,000 to 15,000). Finally, some online bookmakers 
(e.g., Bwin, Interwetten) charge a “handling fee” of 10% when bettors with-
draw money from the online account instead of reinvesting it. Thus, not every 
opportunity found in our sample may guarantee a profitable return in reality, 
after taking these hidden costs into account.  
The comparable efficiency of the two market settings 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the European sports betting market 
as a whole does not satisfy the weak-form efficiency assumption as inter-
market arbitrage opportunities are quite frequent. Inter-market arbitrage op-
portunities may arise from pure noise or from different levels of informational 
                                     
4   This could possibly happen if the bookmaker’s odds have attracted unequal relative bet-
ting volumes on each outcome (resulting in a so-called “unbalanced book”) and the actual 
result of the match stacks against him. In this case, the bookmaker might be unable to 
pay out winners with the stakes of losers.  
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efficiency between the two markets. If the former holds true, then price differ-
ences between the markets are non-systematically connected to the observed 
outcome probability and therefore both markets can be seen as equally con-
tributing to the existence of arbitrage opportunities. In the latter case, the 
price differences, and therefore arbitrage opportunities, are caused by a given 
market posting odds that are off the efficient level on average, while the other 
market’s predictions tend to be closer to the observed outcome probabilities. 
Hence, in this section, we study the comparable efficiency of the different 
market settings.  
If a betting market is efficient, then the odds fully reflect all relevant informa-
tion, such that there is no better predictor of the outcome’s true probability 
than the posted odds themselves. Therefore, no other source of information 
bears the potential for improving the prediction accuracy of the market’s 
odds. Adapted to our context, the difference in prices between the two betting 
markets (as an available source of information) does not improve the predic-
tion accuracy of an efficient market. 
The expected return of a bet is a function of the true probability and the 
posted odd. Therefore, the described relationship between true probability 
and posted odds of an efficient market must translate into observed returns; 
in an efficient market, the observed returns are not systematically associated 
with inter-market price differences because the odds already incorporate all 
relevant information.  
We now set out to test this conjecture for both market settings. We concen-
trate on short  position inter-market arbitrage opportunities
5 and split up 
hedged bets into their components; the bet on the outcome at the bookmaker 
market on one side, and the short bet against the outcome at the exchange 
market on the other side. We calculate the bettor’s return of the accounts at 
the different markets from which the hedged bets were derived. According to 
the efficiency hypothesis, the returns of these accounts should not depend on 
the existence of an arbitrage opportunity as a signal of inter-market price dif-
ferences. If both markets are equally efficient, then the price differences that 
                                     
5   As outlined in the previous chapter in Table 2, the arbitrage opportunities from the short 
strategy are by far the most relevant because they account for the highest available arbi-
trage returns in 88% of all cases (1,285 out of 1,452 matches with an arbitrage opportuni-
ty).  
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enable arbitrage opportunities are unsystematically distributed over the true 
outcome probability, and both the bookmaker as well as the Betfair account 
should similarly contribute to the observed arbitrage opportunities. If, on the 
other hand, the odds of the exchange market (bookmaker market) are closer 
to the efficient level than the odds of the bookmaker market (exchange mar-
ket), then we expect that bets at the bookmaker market on the outcome (the 
bets at the exchange market against the outcome) should perform abnormally 
well if arbitrage opportunities exist. Table 3 presents the average return of 
the bookmaker account and the average return of the Betfair account when-
ever we identified a short position inter-market arbitrage opportunity.  
 
The net profit derived from the short position inter-market arbitrage oppor-
tunities is accumulated on the bookmaker account, whereas the Betfair ac-
count serves as (costly) hedging. This finding gives the impression that, on 










Notes: The table summarizes the returns of short position
arbitrage bets (first row) and the returns of the accounts from
which they are derived; the bet on the outcome at the bookmaker
market (second row) and the short bet against the outcome at the
exchange market (third row). It can be seen that the net profit
derived from the arbitrage opportunities is accumulated on the








However, the returns of the positions are not directly comparable because the 
stakes placed at each of the different markets are not equal. In order to hedge 
against the outcome of the game, the stakes were spread according to Equa-
tions (14) and (15). In the following, we drop the idea of optimal hedging and 
place a one-unit wager at each of the two positions and calculate its ex post 
return. Again, market efficiency implies that the return of a given position 
stays at the same level on average, independent of whether the two markets’ 
prices deviate, because price differences that cause an arbitrage opportunity 
should not reveal any relevant information about the true value of the con-


















Notes: The table summarizes the returns of the positions from which short position hedged
bets are derived. This is done for the bookmaker offering the highest odds (first panel) as well
as a randomly chosen single bookmaker (second panel). The returns are calculated for all
matches and events (first column) and for the cases offering an inter‐market arbitrage
opportunity (second column). It can be seen that both positions deviate from their average









The first column depicts returns when wagering on all games and on all out-
comes and the second column represents cases in which an inter-market arbi-
trage opportunity existed. Although we selected the bookmaker with the 
highest odds in the first panel in Table 4, the margins charged are higher here 
(-7.2%) than at the betting exchange (-1.8%). In order to derive evidence of 
the comparative efficiency of the two different betting market mechanisms, we 
compare the average returns of the markets’ positions over all events (first 
column) with the returns of bets for which an arbitrage opportunity existed 
(second column). The deviation from the average return is more pronounced 
at the bookmaker market than at the bet exchange. The average return of the 
bet exchange position decreases from -1.8% to -4.6%, whereas the average 
return from the bookmaker position improves from -7.2% to 12.6%. Therefore, 
if bettors place their entire stakes at the bookmaker market whenever inter-
market arbitrage was possible instead of hedging against the outcome at the 
bet exchange, then they could substantially increase their expected profits. 
One could argue that this result may be driven by the simple fact that the 
bookmaker position is composed of the extreme odds of eight different book-
makers and therefore has a higher likelihood to be off the efficient level. In 
order to control for this issue, we recalculate the average returns if the odds 
of a random bookmaker are used instead of selecting the most attractive 
bookmaker odds. The results are presented in the second panel. Our previous 
findings from the first panel are not sensitive to this specification. Again, 
when considering a single bookmaker that is randomly chosen, the deviation 
from the average returns is more pronounced at the bookmaker market than 
at the bet exchange. If bets are only selected when an arbitrage opportunity 
exists, then the bookmaker return improves from -12.3% to 14.6%, whereas 
the return on the bet exchange market changes to a lesser extent, decreasing 
from -1.8% to -9.4%. Hence, inter-market arbitrage opportunities seemingly 
serve as a signal of biased bookmaker odds. 
Thus far, the differences in prices between the two markets have been reduced 
to a simple dichotomous signal: whether an arbitrage opportunity exists or 
not. We next test the robustness of the result when the entire range of price 
differences is taken into account. We therefore examine how well the odds of 
a given market predict the outcome of a match and test whether the predic-
tion accuracy could be improved by the additional information about the  
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price difference between the two markets. To get a market’s forecast of an 
outcome, we transform the odds into implicit probabilities. The implicit prob-
ability is simply the inverse of the odd adjusted for a possible margin included 
in the odds.
6 Thus, 
     ,   
1
   , 
1 
1
   ,   
  (18)
holds for the implicit probability of the exchange market, and 
    ,   
1
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  (19)
holds for the implicit probability of the bookmaker market. If the betting 
market is efficient, then the implicit probability is the best available approxi-
mation of the true outcome probability, and the price of a parallel market 
does not provide any information already present in the market. If the price 
of the parallel market is able to improve the forecasts of the actual outcome 
beyond the posted odds, then the efficiency hypothesis is rejected for the bet-
ting market at issue. We test the efficiency hypothesis of the two markets by 
running the following regressions, including the bets of all three outcomes   
(win, draw, loss), for each of the 5,478 matches in our sample: 
                         ,       Π     
     
 ,    (20)
                         ,       Π     
     
 ,   .  (21)
The binary dependent variable          takes the value 1 if the match’s ob-
served outcome was actually the outcome of a given bet; otherwise it takes 
the value 0. The variable  Π     
     
 ,  is the return of a short position hedged bet 
as defined by Equation (16) in the second chapter, except that it is calculated 
                                     
6   In the case of the bookmaker, this is the already mentioned overround. The odds traded at 
Betfair can contain an overround as well, because they are determined by members of the 
betting audience, who trade bets directly with each other. The average bookmaker over-
round in our sample is 11%, whereas the average overround at Betfair is 0.6%.  
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specifically for a given outcome   and a specific bookmaker  .
7 The return of 
the short position hedged bet is, as we outlined in the theoretical section, in-
dependent from the actual outcome of the game. It is a continuous variable 
that represents the deviation of prices between the two markets.
8 As we as-
sume that the error term follows a standard normal distribution, we derive 
our coefficients from a maximum likelihood estimation of a probit model. The 
marginal effects, the standard errors and the levels of significance are pre-
sented in Table 5. The bookmaker is randomly selected from the pool of 
available bookmakers in each match. 
                                     
7   In the theoretical chapter, the return of a short position hedged bet was defined as the 
optimal alternative from the set of all outcomes of a match and the set of all available 
bookmakers. Following the short position arbitrage strategy, hedged bets are available on 
the outcome level because the same bet bought at the bookmaker market can be sold at 
the betting exchange. 
8   Another possibility would be to directly introduce the odds of the two parallel markets 
into the model. A potential problem of such a procedure is the high multicollinearity be-
tween the two variables. Using the return of the hedged bet as the explanatory variable, 
we circumvent this issue.  
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Whereas the return of the hedged bet helps explain the true outcome prob-
abilities at the bookmaker market, it does not do so at the bet exchange. The 
odds traded at Betfair already reflect all relevant information, whereas the 
bookmaker odds seem biased. At the bookmaker market, the return of the 
hedged bet renders additional explanatory power beyond the implicit prob-
abilities of the bookmaker odds. The results in Table 5 reveal a significantly 
positive correlation between the outcome variable and the return of the short 
position hedged bet return. This implies that whenever the odds posted by 
the bookmaker are higher than the odds traded at Betfair after being adjusted 
for commission (see Equation 17), the bookmaker odds are on average too 
high and the implicit probabilities are too low. If the return of the hedged bet 
is negative because the odds of the bookmaker are lower than the adjusted 
Betfair odds, then the bookmaker odds are on average too low and the im-










Notes: The table presents the additional explanatory power for the outcome of a
match, which is rendered by the price differences between the two markets. The
dependent variable is the observed outcome of a match. The explaining variables
are the probabilities implied by the odds of a randomly chosen bookmaker (first
column) or of the exchange market (second column) and the return of the short
position hedged bet as a measure of inter‐market price difference. The marginal
effects of a probit regression (robust standard errors clustered on match level in
parantheses) are given. ***, **, * denotes signifcance at the 0.1% , 1%, 5% level
respectively. It can be seen that, in contrast to the exchange market, the odds of












Overall, we demonstrated that the price differences between the two markets 
are not due to noise. Instead, the bet exchange market clearly outperforms 
the bookmaker market in terms of informational efficiency. Our finding is in 
line with recent results by Smith et al. (2009) and Franck et al. (2009) show-
ing that the bet exchange odds better predict the actual outcomes than the 
bookmaker odds.  
Concluding remarks 
Unlike related literature that concentrates on intra-market arbitrage, this pa-
per investigated inter-market arbitrage in sports betting. Due to the recent 
emergence of exchange platforms such as betfair.com, betting on all possible 
outcomes of an event in order to hedge against the uncertainty of the match 
outcome is now unnecessary; a bettor can simply buy favourable odds from a 
bookmaker and directly sell those wagers at a potentially higher price at the 
bet exchange market.  
We investigated the odds of eight different bookmakers and the corresponding 
odds traded at Betfair on all soccer games played in the top-five European 
leagues over three seasons (5,478 soccer games). We found (only) ten intra-
market arbitrage opportunities, where the most favourable odds across book-
makers were combined. In 1,450 matches, we identified an inter-market arbi-
trage opportunity. Here, a combined bet at the bookmaker and the exchange 
market yielded a guaranteed positive return with an average of 1.2%. The 
likelihood of finding an arbitrage opportunity increased from 0.2% to 26.5% if 
both bookmaker odds and odds traded at the bet exchange were taken into 
account.  
More detailed analyses revealed that inter-market arbitrage opportunities do 
not result from random price differences between the two markets; rather, 
they are due to different levels of information efficiency. We found clear-cut 
evidence that the bet exchange odds exhibit higher informational efficiency 
than the bookmaker odds. Bettors could therefore achieve higher expected 
returns, specifically 12.6%, if they were willing to accept risk and to bet only 
at the bookmaker market whenever an inter-market arbitrage opportunity 
was identified.   
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Our results are striking as they suggest that price anomalies documented so 
far may be sensitive to the structure of the underlying market. The finding 
that bookmaker odds are less informationally efficient than bet exchange odds 
may have different underlying reasons. First, the two markets may face differ-
ent betting audiences and their prices might simply reflect this instance. 
Thus, bettors endowed with information and beliefs that are more accurate 
may place their bets at the exchange market, while less skilled bettors may 
self-select into the bookmaker market. A hypothetical clean study to test this 
conjecture would randomly assign either the bookmaker market or the bet 
exchange market to comparable bettor pools, and then investigate the de-
mand and the resulting prices in both markets. The barriers to performing 
such experiments in the field are obvious. A second explanation is that both 
market settings face the same demand structure, but they might not be 
equally effective with respect to translating dispersed beliefs into efficient 
prices. Even though there have been initial theoretical attempts (see, e.g., 
Kuypers, 2000; Levitt, 2004; Franck, Verbeek, and Nüesch, 2007), the litera-
ture on gambling markets lacks a comprehensive model of how investor beliefs 
translate into prices at different market settings. Our results may stimulate 
further research on this track.  
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